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Electing the U.N. Secretary-General After
the Cold War
by
JOAKIM E. PARKER*
Introduction
On December 3, 1991, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was elected the sixth
Secretary-General of the United Nations.' He assumed a position that
has increased in stature as the United Nations' role in international af-
fairs has grown in significance over the past half decade.2 Javier P6rez de
Cu6l1ar, Ghali's predecessor, was visibly active in matters such as the
release of hostages, dispute resolution, and the Persian Gulf War, partic-
ularly during his last three years in office. 3 This greater visibility and
importance heightened the stakes involved in filling the position.
The United Nations Charter states that the "Secretary-General shall
be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
* Member, Third Year Class; A.B. 1988, Stanford University. I would like to thank
the friends I met in Kenya and Tanzania, Krishna Patel, Ahmadi Bakari, Othman Kinguneki,
and Moses Polepole, for providing the inspiration for this Note.
1. G.A. Res. 46/21, reported in Summary of Scheduled Meetings, JOURNAL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 4, 1991, at 7 (forthcoming in U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/46/49). Ghali's term runs from January 1, 1992 through December 31, 1996. Id.; see also
Ghali Appointed U.N. Secretary-General from Jan. 1, Reuters, Dec. 3, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World library, Allnws file. The previous five Secretary-Generals were Trygve Lie,
Dag Hammarskj6ld, U Thant, Kurt Waldheim, and Javier P6rez de Cufl1ar.
2. See Leon Gordenker, International Organization in the New World Order, FLETCHER
F. WORLD AFF., Summer 1991, at 71, 71-75 (dating beginning of the "revival of the United
Nations" to 1987 Soviet announcement of greater deference to the U.N. and likely subsequent
U.S. response of increasing participation). The 1990s have been proclaimed "the decade of
international law." G.A. Res. 44/23, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 31, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/44/23 (1989).
3. See B.G. Ramcharan, The Office of the United Nations Secretary-General, 13 DAL-
HOUSIE L.J. 742, 746-55 (1990) (outlining efforts in dispute resolution and preventive diplo-
macy, such as El Salvador-FMLN situation, Haitian election process, Burkina Faso-Mali
border dispute); M. Christiane Bourloyannis, Fact-Finding by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 641, 643-51 (1990) (describing the "[growth] in
influence and effectiveness" of the Secretary-General in maintaining international peace and
security through fact-finding in Iran-Iraq war, Israel's occupied territories, apartheid in South
Africa, Nicaraguan elections, and upcoming Cambodian elections); The U.N.'s Happy Sur-
prise, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 1991, § 4, at 8.
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Security Council."'4 This language is deceptively simple. In reality, the
General Assembly votes on only a single candidate 5 who has gained the
approval of a nine-vote majority of the Security Council, 6 including all
five permanent members.7 This results in a Secretary-General that repre-
sents, more than anything, a political compromise between the perma-
nent members of the Security Council, 8 with the General Assembly
serving only as a rubber stamp. 9
This practice has been justified as an accommodation of the realities
of the Cold War and superpower conflict.10 The dynamics involved in a
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 97. While the Charter uses the term "appoint," "elect" will be
used by this Note to conform with the reform it proposes. Cf HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 296-97 (1950) (pointing out that use of "appoint" is faulty in light of
relationship between General Assembly and Secretary-General). Others have suggested that
usage of "appoint" has more to do with the character of the Secretary-General's duties than
the character of elevation. See, e.g., LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 269 (1946).
5. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Rule 141, at 30, U.N. Doc.
A/520/Rev. 15, U.N. Sales No. E.85.I. 13 (1985); Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly,
U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., Agenda Item 31(3)(d), at 269, U.N. Doc. A/I1 (1946) (stating that the
Security Council should "proffer one candidate only for.., consideration").
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 2 ("shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members").
There are a total of fifteen members on the Council. Id. art. 23, 1 1; see infra note 7.
7. The Charter itself does not specify that permanent member unanimity is required,
U.N. CHARTER art. 27, % 2; that requirement is found in a General Assembly resolution,
Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, supra note 5, at 269. The five permanent members
of the Security Council are "China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom . . . and the United States." U.N. CHARTER art. 23, 1. The ten other, non-
permanent members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Id. art.23, 1-
2. The Republic of Russia of the Commonwealth of Independent States has assumed the So-
viet seat on the Security Council. Paul Lewis, West Acts to Defer Issue of New U.N. Council
Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1992, at A6 (other four permanent members "moved swiftly, with-
out public debate or any attempt to reopen the Charter, to insure that the former Soviet seat
went to Russia").
"While other organs of the United Nations may make recommendations to Governments,
the Security Council alone has the power to make decisions which all Member States are
obligated under the Charter to accept and carry out." U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., EVERY-
ONE'S UNITED NATIONS at 16, U.N. Sales No. E.85.I.24 (10th ed. 1986) [hereinafter EVERY-
ONE'S UNITED NATIONS]; see also infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (describing duties
and powers of Security Council).
"The General Assembly may discuss any issue coming within the scope of the Charter or
concerning any body established under the Charter." EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS, supra
at 14. Its influence is exercised through the weight of its recommendations as an expression of
world opinion. Id. at 14. Also, "the finances of the United Nations are controlled by the
Assembly." Id. at 15.
8. See infra Part II.B. This has been true from the first election. Josef L. Kunz, The
Legal Position of the Secretary General of the United Nations, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 786, 789
(1946) (Lie appointment "a matter of compromise").
9. BRIAN URQUHART & ERSKINE CHILDERS, A WORLD IN NEED OF LEADERSHIP 25
(1990).
10. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text; STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, THE SECRE-
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changing global political order"1 and the controversies that have sur-
rounded each election, 12 however, demonstrate that the time has come to
revise the electoral procedures.
As a result of the relaxation of Cold War tensions, the permanent
members of the Security Council are developing greater commonalities of
interest 13 while North-South tensions are increasing.' 4 If the developed
nations continue to dominate the election process, the result may be the
election of a Secretary-General unwilling to take positions that are con-
trary to the interests of those developed nations.1 5 Although it is not
desirable to continue the paradigm of unyielding ideological opposition
that created deadlock in the United Nations for a number of years,16
creating a lopsided balance of power is likewise incompatible with a sys-
TARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS 36 (1952) (rules were part of "a compromise...
[for] insuring unanimous Great Power sponsorship" of the United Nations).
11. This Note purposely avoids the popular phrase "new world order" because it is a
creation of the Bush Administration, James Schlesinger, New Instabilities, New Priorities, FOR-
EIGN POL'Y, Winter 1991-1992, at 3, and because it is not clear that there is a "new" world
order at this point in time. Cf John Wilner, Foreword, What's New About The New World
Order?, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer 1991. The "changing global political order"
refers to the dissolution of the Communist regimes and the growth of democratization. See
also Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 601, 601-02 (1990) (describing the emerging order as the end of the Cold War
and the rising tide of democracy); infra Part III.A.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking Multilat-
eral Disarmament and Development Assistance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 993, 996 (1991) (describ-
ing areas of increasing U.S.-Soviet cooperation and interest-sharing such as "bilateral arms
control, trade, human rights, and regional matters"); James A. Baker, From Points to Path-
ways of Mutual Advantage: Next Steps in Soviet-American Relations, Address Before the
American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations (Oct. 19, 1990), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CUR-
RENT POL'Y No. 1309, at 2-3 (1990) (detailing U.S.-Soviet cooperation in resolution of re-
gional conflicts, arms control, political reform, technical economic contacts, and participation
in international market institutions); Thomas L. Friedman, How U.S. Won Support to Use
Mideast Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1990, § 1, at 1 (detailing consensus building leading up to
Security Council resolutions on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait); see also Franck, supra note 11, at
613 (suggesting that "hegemonic tendencies" among the developed nations are significant).
China remains the only permanent member of the Security Council not committed to capital-
ism, but it rarely uses its veto-power clout. See generally ANJALI V. PATIL, THE UN VETO IN
WORLD AFFAIRS, 1946-1990 (1991) (China has used a solitary veto only once since 1945).
14. See Koplow & Schrag, supra note 13, at 993-94 (economic disparity and arms
proliferation are an increasingly "urgent pair of North-South problems"); see also infra notes
132-136 and accompanying text.
15. See Brian Urquhart, The U.N.'s Crucial Choice, FOREIGN PoL'Y, Fall 1991, at 157,
158-59; cf infra Part II.A.
16. See, eg., SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
288-90 (1988) (detailing deadlock in Lie reappointment in 1950s). For broader examples of
deadlock in the Security Council, see infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text, 1956 U.N.Y.B.
3-56, U.N. Sales No. 1957.1.1 (1956 Mideast crisis over Palestine question and Suez Canal),
and 1967 U.N.Y.B. 158-265, U.N. Sales No. E.68.I.I (Arab-Israeli war).
tem that is dependent on cooperation. 17 The developing nations should
not be marginalized or disenfranchised in the post-Cold War era. 18 One
way to prevent this is to give them a greater voice in the United Nations
through increased influence in the selection of the Secretary-General. 19
The current electoral procedures were contradictorily imposed on
certain provisions of the Charter at the time of its conception.20 Little
justification exists for their retention in the face of a changing world.
During the early development of the Charter, negotiators assumed that
the Security Council would operate on a simple majority basis in recom-
mending candidates to the General Assembly. 2' It was not until the
emergence of the superpower conflict at the end of World War II that an
interpretation requiring permanent member unanimity was forced upon
the other members of the prospective United Nations. 22 Because that
interpretation is found not in the Charter but in rules later established by
a preparatory commission to the first session of the General Assembly, 23
it is not an explicit requirement of the Charter itself.
Reformation of the current election process may thus be more easily
accomplished, because Charter amendment is not required. 24 Redefining
the acts of recommendation and appointment in the Security Council
and General Assembly, respectively, would solve the problems caused by
the current process. 25 This would give the General Assembly a real voice
in elections, 26 acknowledge the ramifications of the changing global polit-
17. See RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 964 (1958).
Cooperation is necessary due to the principle of national sovereignty recognized by the 1943
"Declaration of Four Nations on General Security," reprinted in RUSSELL, supra at 977, and
formalized in the Charter, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 1.
18. The United Nations is based on "the equal rights of... nations large and small."
U.N. CHARTER preamble. Marginalization of the developing world also conflicts with the
General Assembly's call for a "new international economic order based on sovereign equality,
interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States." Declaration on the Right
to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, art. 3, 3, at 186-
87, U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/128 (1987).
19. See The Right Choice for the U.N., N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1991, at A30 ("If the Perma-
nent Five ignore the third world's just claims for a greater say in the U.N., it would suggest
that Mr. Bush's New World Order has no place for the powerless.").
20. See infra Part I.
21. See infra notes 54-57, 65-66 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
23. The commission's interpretation was that "[flrom the provisions.., of the Charter, it
is clear that, for the nomination of the Secretary-General by the Security Council, an affirma-
tive vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members, is re-
quired." Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations at 87, U.N. Doc. PC/20
(1945).
24. See infra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part II.
26. The Assembly would have a greater voice both through its non-permanent members
on the Security Council (they hold a majority there, U.N. CHARTER art. 23, 1) and because
its "appointment" vote would be more than a rubber stamp.
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ical order,27 and accommodate proposals for improving the recruitment
of candidates. 28 Furthermore, such reform would enhance both the inde-
pendence of the Secretariat and the effectiveness of the United Nations in
addressing issues facing all nations.
Part I of this Note explores the events that led to the development of
the standing rules of procedure, and exposes the inconsistent principles
upon which those rules are based. Part II traces the problems that have
occurred during past elections to those rules. Part III sets forth the crite-
ria for a more successful election process and discusses the obstacles that
stand in the way of change. Part IV proposes a modification of the elec-
toral rules that satisfies the criteria established in Part III.
I. "Legislative History" of the Rules on Electing the
Secretary-General
Presently, the Security Council's recommendation for Secretary-
General is not considered a "procedural" matter,29 and the General As-
sembly's subsequent election is not considered an "important" matter.30
As a result, a "qualified majority" of nine votes of the Security Council,
including unanimity among the permanent members,31 followed by a
simple majority in the General Assembly, 32 are required to elect the
Secretary-General. An examination of the development of these pro-
cedures during the negotiations that led to the United Nations Confer-
ence on International Organization in 194533 and their adoption in
27. See infra notes 130-136 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., URQUHART & CHILDERS, supra note 9, at 29-30 (proposing single term
limitation, rules and a timetable for nominations, establishment of a search group, and affirma-
tive action for women); Max Jakobson, Filling the World's Most Impossible Job, WORLD MON-
ITOR, Aug. 1991, at 25, 32-33 (proposing de-emphasis of nationality concerns, wider search,
and openly declared candidacies).
29. The Charter distinguishes matters before the Security Council by whether they are
"procedural" or not. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 2-3 ("[P]rocedural matters shall be made by
an affirmative vote of nine members... all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote
of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members."). Thus, recom-
mendation is not at present procedural because it requires unanimity among the five perma-
nent members. See supra note 7.
30. The Charter distinguishes matters before the General Assembly by whether they are
"important" or not. U.N. CHARTER art. 18, 2-3 ("Decisions... on important questions
shall be made by a two-thirds majority .... Decisions on other questions... shall be made by
a majority."). The election of the Secretary-General is not listed in the Charter as an "impor-
tant question." Id.
31. The phrase "qualified majority" is often used to describe a nine-vote majority that
includes unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council. RUSSELL, supra
note 17, at 720-21 n.14.
32. "Decisions on [non-important] questions.., shall be made by a majority of the mem-
bers present and voting." U.N. CHARTER art. 18, 3.
33. The United Nations Conference on International Organization [hereinafter the "San
Francisco Conference"] was held in San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945 to draft the
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194634 reveals that they are inconsistent with basic principles that guided
the Charter's creation.
A. Procedure in the Security Council
The permanent members' veto power is the critical element in the
Security Council's "recommendation" to the General Assembly. 35 A
candidate must be acceptable to all permanent members, as well as to a
majority of nine members of the Security Council.36 The qualified major-
ity formula applies to all matters that are not "procedural"; 37 it is in
distinguishing between what is and is not procedural, however, that the
formula's applicability to recommendations becomes questionable. 38
The Security Council was given "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, ' 39 along with certain
powers for settling disputes4° and initiating enforcement and sanction ac-
tions, 41 to fulfill that responsibility. The qualified majority formula was
developed to avoid repeating the failures of the Council of the League of
Nations (the Security Council's predecessor) in dealing with such secur-
ity issues.42 The League Council's failures were due in large part to its
voting rules, which required unanimity not only of its permanent mem-
bers but also of the entire membership. 43 By contrast, a qualified majority
does not require unanimity of the entire membership.
Charter and establish the United Nations. Earlier negotiations revolved primarily around the
United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom during wartime conferences at
Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and in Crimea earlier in 1945. The four "sponsoring governments"
of the Conference were China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Doc. 3, G/2, 1 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 1 (1945).
34. Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, supra note 5, at 267-69.
35. By requiring unanimity among the permanent members, the rule effectively gives
each permanent member the power to "veto" any potential candidate for the Secretary-
Generalship.
36. See supra notes 6-7.
37. See supra note 29.
38. See generally BLAINE SLOANE, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLU-
TIONS IN OUR CHANGING WORLD 26-28 (1991) (discussing "recommendation" as a term of
art in the U.N. Charter).
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
40. "The Security Council may investigate any dispute ... [and] recommend appropriate
procedures or methods of adjustment ... [or] recommend such terms of settlement as it may
consider appropriate." U.N. CHARTER arts. 34, 36, 2, 37, 2.
41. "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER
art. 39.
42. See generally GEORGE ScoTt, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
369-98 (1973) (discussing failures such as Italy-Ethiopia crisis, Japanese acts against China,
Spanish civil war, and build-up to World War II).
43. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 5, I ("[D]ecisions at any meeting... shall
require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting."); see also
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The negotiations on voting procedure in the Security Council, from
'the Dumbarton Oaks Conference44 to the Yalta Conference 45 and the
San Francisco Conference, centered on the applicability of the qualified
majority formula to decisionmaking on security issues in the Security
Council.46 The United States, in July of 1944, proposed that only the
following decisions should require a qualified majority: (1) assumption
of jurisdiction over a dispute;47 (2) "the terms of settlement of dis-
putes"; 48 (3) negotiations "on the regulation of armaments and armed
forces"; 49 (4) "the determination of threats to the peace"; 50 and (5) "the
institution and application of measures of enforcement. '51 During the
San Francisco Conference the same distinction was reiterated in a joint
statement by the four sponsoring governments: the "voting formula rec-
ognizes that the Security Council, in discharging its responsibilities for
the maintenance of international peace and security, will have two broad
groups of functions."' 52 Article 27 of the Charter formalized this group-
ing of functions by requiring a qualified majority in all decisions relating
Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 506, 507 (1991) ("Mhe League of Nations could act only on the basis of unanimity
and persuasion. Its Council was ineffective in confronting the appalling threats to the peace of
the thirties.").
44. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference was held from August 21 through October 7, 1944,
and involved China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It pro-
duced the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, providing a point of departure for preparation of the
U.N. Charter. Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General International
Organization, Oct. 7, 1944, reprinted in RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 1019.
45. The Yalta Conference (also known as the Crimean Conference) was held February 4-
11, 1945, and involved the heads of state of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Voting procedure in an international body was one of a number of issues dis-
cussed there. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
CONFERENCES AT MALTA AND YALTA 660-67 (1945).
46. "Throughout the discussions leading to the approval of the Charter, first at Dumbar-
ton Oaks, then at Yalta, and finally at San Francisco, the assumed foundation of post-war
peace had been great-power unanimity." JOSEPH P. MORRAY, FROM YALTA TO DISARMA-
MENT: COLD WAR DEBATE 74 (1961). Manifestations of this assumption are found both
before and after the San Francisco Conference in the League of Nations, COVENANT OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS art. 15, and United Nations, U.N. CHARTER art. 27, where great-power
unanimity is required for decisions on the maintenance of world peace. During World War II,
the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China declared "that their
united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war... [would] be continued for the organi-
zation and maintenance of peace and security." Declaration of Four Nations on General Se-
curity, Oct. 30, 1943, reprinted in RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 977 (emphasis added).
47. United States Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization, July 18,
1944, ch. III, art. C, 2, reprinted in RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 995, 999.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure
in the Security Council, Doc. 852, III/1/37(1), 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 711 (1945).
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to international peace and security, and using the term "procedural" to
characterize general majority matters. 53
The recommendation of a candidate for Secretary-General was
never included in the category of "measures for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security" that require a qualified majority. 54 Indeed,
elections of both General Assembly and Security Council presidents are
considered procedural in nature. 55 Decisions that concern relations be-
tween the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations (in-
cluding the Secretariat) are considered procedural as well. 56
Furthermore, putting the recommendation to a procedural vote rather
than requiring a qualified majority would have reflected a lesson learned
from the experience of the League of Nations. The League's unanimity
rule for the election of its secretary-general subordinated that position to
the League Council, creating what has been recognized as a "weakness
which contributed to the League's ultimate failure."' 57 In the context of
the United Nations, then, how did qualified majority voting come to be
applied to a procedural recommendation?
The answer is found in the escalating tensions between the war pow-
ers as the Second World War approached its conclusion: "[A]s military
victory approached, the political dilemmas and disagreements over the
postwar settlement sharpened." s58 At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference,
the Soviet Union began pushing for application of qualified majority vot-
ing to the determination of the Security Council's recommendation for
Secretary-General: 59 "The Soviet Union wanted the veto.., in order to
53. See supra note 29.
54. See George A. Finch, The United Nations Charter, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 542-44
(1945) (focus regarding veto power was on enforcement action issues). But see infra notes 58-
72 and accompanying text (subjecting recommendation to veto negotiated by the major powers
as a separate issue related to the increasing tensions between them).
55. "The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its Presi-
dent for each session." U.N. CHARTER art. 21. "The Security Council shall adopt its own
rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President." Id. art. 30.
56. "It may be inferred.., that all decisions which concern the relationship between the
Security Council and other organs of the United Nations... relate to the internal procedure of
the United Nations, and, consequently, are subject to a procedural vote." EDUARDO JIMfNEZ
DE ARItCHAGA, VOTING AND THE HANDLING OF DISPUTES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 8
(1950). This inference is based upon Charter provisions providing for procedural votes in
matters between the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. CHARTER art. 20, in
interagency cooperation with the Economic and Social Council, id. art. 70, and in procuring
the assistance of the specialized agencies, id. art. 9 1.
57. ScoTT, supra note 42, at 66.
58. ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 30
(1981). "[T]he end of the war made the relationship between the Soviet Union and the West-
ern Allies [even] more difficult." MORRAY, supra note 46, at 77.
59. RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 431-32. At an early stage the United States agreed with
this proposition, id., but later reversed itself, and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals consequently
left open the question of voting in the Security Council. Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the
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protect itself from a hostile majority in the Security Council." 6 Because
of its interests in Eastern Europe and its status as a Communist minority
of one, the Soviet Union wanted to ensure in every way possible that it
would not be isolated in the United Nations.61
In the year preceding the San Francisco Conference, the United
States was indecisive as to whether a qualified majority should be re-
quired for recommendation, 62 but initially argued against the proposition
at the Conference. 63 The rest of the international community also op-
posed its adoption.64 Despite this near consensus of opinion, the Soviet
Union prevailed by playing off the tensions between it and the other ma-
jor powers.
The first San Francisco Conference committee to consider the issue
concluded that no qualified majority vote should apply.65 This position
was the result of a compromise between those nations calling for a simple
majority of six votes and those nations seeking a stricter majority.66 The
Soviet delegation managed to have the question resubmitted to another
committee after raising a technical point, however,67 and then raised the
stakes by linking the recommendation issue to its position on the much
larger Security Council veto question then being debated. 68 The other
Establishment of a General International Organization, Oct. 7, 1944, ch. 6, § C, reprinted in
RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 1022.
60. MORRAY, supra note 46, at 75. At this time, the vast majority of nations could be
counted on to take positions favorable to the United States. M.J. PETERSON, THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY IN WORLD POLrrTcs 254 (1986).
61. "Stalin thought in terms of spheres of influence . . . [in other words] [s]ecurity
through expansion." RUBINSTEIN, supra note 58, at 34. The Soviets sought to establish "se-
curity zones in Southeastern Europe and in the Middle East, especially in Iran and via the
Straits." Charles Prince, Current Views of the Soviet Union on the International Organization
of Security, Economic Cooperation and International Law: A Summary, 39 AM. J. INT'L L.
450, 484 (1945).
62. See RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 374-77; cf id. at 366-67 (discussing U.S. view in early
1944 that "[o]nly the most important security decisions . . . justified the requirement of'
unanimity).
63. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 710-11, 742-
43 (1945) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS 1945]; see also Doc. 328, I/1/13, 8 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. 332 (1945) (record of the decision).
64. See Doc. 975, III/1/50, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 542 (1945).
65. "It is the intent of the Committee that the majority stipulated shall be a majority of
any seven members and need not include the concurrent votes of the five permanent mem-
bers.... ." Doc. 666, II/l/26(1)(a), 8 U.N.C.I.O. Dos. 452 (1945).
66. FOREIGN RELATIONS 1945, supra note 63, at 741-42. In fact, it had been a possibil-
ity that the Committee would approve election solely by the General Assembly, so a qualified
majority rule "could never have gotten through the Committee." Id.
67. The Soviets exercised a Conference prerogative they possessed by having the question
switched to another committee. Doc. 719, 11/8, 8 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 34 (1945). In that com-
mittee the permanent members held five of the eight seats, setting up the Soviets' political
maneuvering. Doc. 897, III/I/42, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 432 (1945).
68. See FOREIGN RELATIONS 1945, supra note 63, at 919-20 (Soviets "would not com-
permanent members, interested in retaining the overall veto69 and wor-
ried about keeping the Soviets in the United Nations, 70 capitulated on the
recommendation issue.7I When the second committee voted on the ques-
tion, they stood unanimous with the Soviets. 72 Since the permanent
members held the majority of seats on the second committee, that com-
mittee not surprisingly recommended a qualified majority requirement. 73
Having lost the major battle over the veto power, most of the smaller
nations gave up the fight over the recommendation procedure. 74 There-
after, the rule was incorporated into the United Nations Preparatory
Commission's report,75 and subsequently approved by resolution at the
first session of the United Nations. 76 Thus, although the maneuverings
of the Soviet Union and the other permanent members at the San Fran-
cisco Conference did not violate Conference procedure, the electoral
rules they established ignored the basic distinction between matters re-
lated to security and matters unrelated to security.
In sum, a matter that by all other measures should have been con-
sidered procedural, requiring only a simple nine-vote majority in the Se-
curity Council, 77 instead became the subject of a deviant application of
the qualified majority formula to ease tensions between the Soviet Union
and the other sponsoring members of the United Nations. The recom-
mendation procedure in the Security Council today stands as a testament
promise any further"). For the debate, see Doc. 897, III/1/42 to Doc. 1203, III/1/48(3), 11
U.N.C.I.O. Does. 430-539 (1945).
69. The larger application of the veto power, to decisions on matters of international
peace and security, U.N. CHARTER art. 18, 2, was of paramount importance to the perma-
nent members as the leaders of the war effort. See supra note 46.
70. "Without these concessions, the Soviet Union was perfectly ready to abandon the...
venture." Thomas M. Franck, Soviet Initiatives: U.S. Responses-New Opportunities for Reviv-
ing the United Nations System, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 531, 534 (1989). Minutes from meetings of
the U.S. and Soviet delegations at the San Francisco Conference indicate the fear that, as to the
voting formula, "any appeal to Moscow might well endanger the progress of the entire Confer-
ence [because] ... [a]ny attempt to alter the existing formula ... would be looked upon as a
breach of faith." FOREIGN RELATIONS 1945, supra note 63, at 918-19.
71. FOREIGN RELATIONS 1945, supra note 63, at 742-44.
72. Id. at 999. A U.S. delegate presented the situation to the other delegations in this
manner: "The initial differences among the sponsoring governments on the interpretation of
the voting procedure [has] been resolved in a spirit of complete unity." Doc. 897, 111/1/42, I1
U.N.C.I.O. Does. 433 (1945).
73. Doc. 984, III/1/52, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 571 (1945).
74. Doc. 1050, 111/1/58, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 692 (1945). As the delegate from New
Zealand stated, "the hard choice... rest[ed] with each delegate to accept that system or to fail
in creating the Organization." Doc. 936, III/1/45, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 472 (1945).
75. Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, supra note 23, at 87.
76. Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, supra note 5, at 267-69.
77. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (on why procedural). The first commit-
tee to consider the issue at the San Francisco Conference had recognized the true nature of the
procedure-it is "not mandatory at all. It is simply a recommendation." Doc. 719, 11/8, 8
U.N.C.I.O. Does. 33 (1945).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
November 1992] ELECTING THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL
to the Cold War-a strategic paradigm that has lost most of its
significance.
B. Procedure in the General Assembly
The rule regarding the role of the General Assembly in the election
of the Secretary-General was far less controversial than the qualified ma-
jority vote rule in the Security Council, 78 but it too rests on questionable
grounds.
The most glaring contradiction lies in the fact that elections in the
General Assembly for less important U.N. positions require stricter ma-
jorities. For example, elections of the non-permanent members of the
Security Council and members of other U.N. councils require, as "im-
portant questions," a "two-thirds majority of the members present and
voting."'79
Because the Charter itself does not specify the type of vote necessary
to elect the Secretary-General,80 the General Assembly's 1946 resolution
calling for a simple majority81 may have been merely a carryover of the
provisions of the League of Nations Covenant, which specified election
by simple majority.8 2 In any case, the issue was given little consideration
at the San Francisco Conference.83
Early U.S. draft proposals for the Charter listed a "two-thirds ma-
jority.., for admitting new members and the other electoral functions of
the Assembly."8s4 This language would seem to encompass the election
of the Secretary-General. It also complements the notion that the Secre-
tary-General should "represent the 'general interests' of the entire world.
The lack of such an expression of the international view.., had been a
weakness of the League [of Nations]. '8 5 The failure of the U.S. draft
language to make it into the Charter is inexplicable. 86
That the rules governing the election of the Secretary-General in
both the Security Council and the General Assembly clash with the more
78. Conference documents expose no controversy over the simple majority rule, most
likely because most delegations were focused on the more significant debate over the qualified
majority rule in the Security Council. See RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 843 (stating that rule
was "adopted without objection").
79. U.N. CHARTER art. 18, t 2.
80. It states only that the "Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assem-
bly." U.N. CHARTER art. 97. How one is "appointed" is not defined.
81. Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, supra note 5, at 267-69.
82. "[T]he Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the
majority of the Assembly." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 6, 2.
83. See supra note 78.
84. RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 367.
85. Id. at 375.
86. The only reason given in committee documents for not including the election in the
list of important questions was "that it would be undesirable for the Charter to specify a long
list of such questions." Doe. 528, II/1/24, 8 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 389 (1945).
fundamental principles of the Charter suggests that problems might arise
in their implementation. 87 This is in fact what has happened in each of
the six Secretary-General elections since the adoption of the rules.
II. Problems in the Elections
The manipulation of the meanings of "recommendation" and "ap-
point" in 1945 resulted in significant problems in U.N. elections. The
clearest examples of these problems are discussed below, in chronological
order.
A. Re-Election Blackballing
Trygve Lie, a compromise candidate, 88 was elected the first Secre-
tary-General on February 1, 1946.89 His re-election provides the best
example of a problem that was predicted by the nations opposed to the
qualified vote requirement at the San Francisco Conference. These na-
tions worried that the Secretary-General's "independence would be jeop-
ardized if his reelection could be blocked by the vote of one permanent
member," 90 because he or she would recognize that adopting policy posi-
tions antagonistic to the permanent members might well provoke the use
of their veto at any bid for re-election.91
Lie antagonized two members of the Security Council, and as a re-
sult the Security Council never recommended him for re-election.92 Dur-
ing his first term Lie supported "vigorous United Nations action in
87. It was predicted early on that the permanent members would "try to extend [the veto
power] to matters which any detached student would immediately regard as merely procedural
in character." Pitman B. Potter, Voting Procedure in the Security Council, 39 AM. J. INT'L L.
318, 320 (1945).
88. "The recommendation by the Security Council was a matter of compromise between
an Eastern European, sponsored by the Soviet Union, and the Canadian Ambassador in Wash-
ington, sponsored by [the United States] and Great Britain, but whose nomination the Soviet
representative threatened to veto." Kunz, supra note 8, at 789.
89. Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., Agenda Item 38,
at 304, U.N. Doc. A/li (1946).
90. Doc. 975, 111/1/50, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 542, 546 (1945).
91. "[T]he Secretary-General [will] work in the knowledge that his chances of re-election
[will] be small if he. . . incur[s] the displeasure of one of the permanent members." Doc. 1087,
1/2/78, 7 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 277, 279 (1945); cf Theodor Meron, "Exclusive Preserves" and the
New Soviet Policy Toward the UN Secretariat, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 322, 329 (1991) ("Is it
realistic to expect a statesman interested in reappointment to reject pressure in one of the areas
where it is in his power to grant favors?"). Secretary-General Ghali appears to be testing this
hypothesis. See Harvey Morris, Give me the Battalions for Peace, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 3,
1992, at 9, available in LEXIS, World library, Allnws file (discussing tensions between perma-
nent members and Ghali, and suggesting that his term "might end sooner rather than later").
92. Lie did serve another term, but not as a result of the normal Charter procedure. See
infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. For Lie's account of events, see TRYGVE LIE, IN
THE CAUSE OF PEACE 367-85 (1954).
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Korea [which] led the Soviet Union to withdraw its support" 93 for him.
Lie's attitude towards Chinese representation in the United Nations94 re-
sulted in Nationalist China's refusal to support Lie's re-election as well. 95
The disagreement over Lie and the failure of the United States and the
Soviet Union to find a mutually acceptable candidate led to complete
deadlock in the Security Council.96
This deadlock left the United Nations with "no way of complying
literally with the provisions of the Charter."97 The General Assembly,
acting with no specific authority,98 voted to "continue" Lie in office for
another three years. 99 These events vindicated predictions not only that
re-elections would be marred by partisanship, but also that Security
Council deadlock over the recommendation of a candidate for Secretary-
General would paralyze the United Nations as an organization. 100
93. BAILEY, supra note 16, at 289.
94. Lie had submitted a legal memorandum to the Security Council which suggested that
representation in the U.N. was based on an analysis of which of two governments is more
obeyed by the populace-a position clearly unfavorable to Nationalist China, with only the
population of Formosa (Taiwan) under its control. See U.N. SCOR, 5th Sss., Supp. Jan.-May
1950, at 18-23, U.N. Doc. S/1466 (1950).
95. BAILEY, supra note 16, at 152-53.
96. Id. at 289-90.
97. Id. at 290.
98. The Charter has no provision for unilateral action by the General Assembly in this
area; it only provides for a vote upon Security Council recommendation. U.N. CHARTER art.
97. The possibility of Security Council deadlock had been addressed a year and a half earlier
in a General Assembly resolution, which called on the permanent members to forbear from use
of the veto. G.A. Res. 267, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 7-10, U.N. Doc. A/900
(1949). Several months before the deadlock over Lie, the International Court of Justice re-
leased an advisory opinion on admission of states to the United Nations that would seem to
question the General Assembly's action on Lie: "it is impossible to admit that the General
Assembly has the power to attribute to a vote of the Security Council the character of a recom-
mendation when the Council itself considers that no such recommendation has been made."
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950
I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3). Two days after Lie's "continuance," however, the General Assembly passed
its "Uniting for Peace" resolution, G.A. Res. 377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10,
U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950), which on a broader scale stated that the General Assembly would
act where "the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails
to exercise its primary responsibilit[ies]." Id. § A, 1 1. "Even its strongest critics in the
United Nations came to accept the validity of... [this] 'backup' mechanism." Harry Reicher,
The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of Its Passage, 20 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 48 (1981). The creation of this mechanism, and the eventual acquiescence
of the permanent members to the General Assembly's action on Lie, leaves open the question
of whether the General Assembly could act in such a manner again, despite the language of the
Charter.
99. G.A. Res. 492, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/Res/492
(1950); cf 1 BUILDING PEACE: REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION To STUDY THE ORGANIZA-
TION OF PEACE 1939-1972, at 360 (1973) (subsequent report urging measures to prevent repe-
tition of the Lie fiasco).
100. Ironically, a U.S. delegate at the San Francisco Conference had "contended that, far
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B. The Lowest Common Denominator
Kurt Waldheim was elected for the first of two terms on December
22, 1971.101 Insofar as Waldheim's own principal political advisor could
describe him no more favorably than as "an energetic, ambitious medioc-
rity,"I 0 2 his election vindicated another prediction made at the San Fran-
cisco Conference: that the qualified majority rule "would compel the
permanent members to reach a compromise, and this might result in the
appointment [of the candidate representing the] 'lowest common denom-
inator.' ",103 "Lowest common denominator" in this context describes a
candidate for Secretary-General who is recommended because he'°4 is
the least unacceptable candidate to the permanent members, despite hav-
ing the poorest qualifications of the candidates for the position. I0 5
Although the United Kingdom and China voted against
Waldheim,10 6 he was the only candidate acceptable to both the Soviet
Union and the United States. 10 7 The situation became a choice "between
Waldheim and a deadlock that would paralyze the organization."'' 0
This pressure and the memory of the Lie fiasco led the United Kingdom
and China to withdraw their vetoes, 0 9 allowing Waldheim to become the
fourth Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Waldheim's poor qualifications were manifested in failures that rid-
dled his tenure. Diverse in scope, his failures ranged from neglecting the
Secretariat" 0 to ignoring the worldwide increase in human rights
violations"' to specific shortcomings in dealing with the Yom Kippur
from being frequently used, the veto would seldom, if ever, be exercised." Doc. 956, III/1/47,
11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 486, 493 (1945).
101. G.A. Res. 2903, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/Res/
2903 (1971).
102. Jakobson, supra note 28, at 27 (quoting Brian Urquhart, former U.N. Undersecre-
tary-General).
103. Doc. 1087, 1/2/78, 7 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 279 (1945) (statement made by delegate from
the Netherlands).
104. A woman has not yet occupied the position of Secretary-General, despite the Char-
ter's affirmation of "the equal rights of men and women." U.N. CHARTER preamble.
105. Not all of the Secretary-Generals are considered lowest common denominators;
Hammarskjbld was an inspired Secretary-General. See Jakobson, supra note 28, at 26. Ironi-
cally, the United States and the Soviet Union viewed Hammarskj6ld as an unpleasant sur-
prise-they had selected him to be a "neutral bureaucrat" who would not rock the boat. Id.
106. No official record was kept of the various votes in the Security Council, BAILEY,
supra note 16, at 293, but Secretary-General U Thant later reported them in his memoirs. See
U THANT, VIEW FROM THE UN 437-38 (1978).
107. Id.
108. Jakobson, supra note 28, at 27.
109. Again, no official record of the voting is kept, but Waldheim later reported on it. See,
e.g., KURT WALDHEIM, IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 35-40 (1985).
110. SHIRLEY HAZZARD, COUNTENANCE OF TRUTH: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
WALDHEIM CASE 109-12 (1989).
111. Id. at 81-88.
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war112 and the Iranian hostage crisis. 113 Waldheim's Nazi past, revealed
in 1986,114 further highlights how poorly qualified he was for the position
of Secretary-General.
The warming of United States-Soviet (and now Russian) relations
does not eliminate the "lowest common denominator" problem. As long
as the selection of the Secretary-General requires compromise between
five major powers, each protecting particular interests, the problem will
remain.
C. Regional Rotation
"[T]he notion that the election of the Secretary-General should be
made subject to rotation among the region[s]"115 of the world played its
most significant role to date in the last Secretary-General election. 116
The regional rotation argument gained special significance because only
Africa, of all the "regions"'1 17 in the world, had not yet seen a representa-
tive occupy the position.11 The regional rotation argument is used in
attempting to circumvent the predominance given the Security Council
in Secretary-General elections and promote candidates from the so-called
"Third World." 119
112. Id at 89. The "Yom Kippur war" is the common description of the 1973 conflict
between Egypt and Israel.
113. AL at 80.
114. Id. at 125. It has even been suggested that the Soviets knew of Waldheim's Nazi past
during his time in office and used it as a means of influence over him. Id. at 94. But see
Jakobson, supra note 28, at 27 ("I for one do not believe in such conspiracy theories. Neither
the Soviets nor the Americans needed a handle to blackmail [Waldheim] in order to ensure his
pliancy." (emphasis added)).
115. Jakobson, supra note 28, at 33. For a more detailed discourse on regional rotation,
see Paul C. Szasz, The Role of the U.N. Secretary-General: Some Legal Aspects, 24 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 161, 168-70 (1991).
116. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, African Nations Press Bid for Top U.N. Post, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1991, at A5 (reporting that the Organization of African Unity submitted six candidates,
secured the backing of the Non-Aligned Movement, and warned that it would actively oppose
any non-African nomination).
117. In the context of regional rotation, the "regions" of the world are Africa, Asia, Eu-
rope, and Latin America. Jakobson, supra note 28, at 33. It is an "unwritten and informal
assumptiono ... [that t]he Secretary-General should not be a national of one of the five Per-
manent Members of the Security Council." URQUHART & CHILDERS, supra note 9, at 26.
This is as much to deny any permanent member an advantage over the others as to prevent too
obvious an appearance of permanent member domination of the United Nations.
118. Lie, Hammarskjdld, and Waldheim were Europeans (Norwegian, Swedish, and Aus-
trian, respectively); Thant was Asian (Burmese); P6rez de Cu6llar was Latin American
(Peruvian).
119. A denigrative term, the "Third World" comprises "those States which emerged from
colonial status [in the 1950s and 1960s] and which saw themselves as constituting a third
'bloc,' distinct from the Communist and Western blocs." ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 396 (Clive Parry et al. eds., 1986).
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Regional rotation tends to contradict the Charter's call for an in-
dependent Secretariat 120 because it implies that a candidate represents a
particular region. 121 That the presidencies of the Security Council 122 and
General Assembly 123 rotate does not justify extension of the concept to
the position of Secretary-General, for these positions are much less im-
portant 124 and require less independence.
Campaigning for an African Secretary-General began with the 1981
election, 125 but did not become a dominant theme until the 1991 election.
The Organization of African Unity distributed a list of six nominees for
the position 126 and secured the backing of the Non-Aligned Move-
ment. 127 Whether the partial accomplishment of their goal in the elec-
tion of Boutros Boutros-Ghali 128 was a result of their campaigning or
120. "In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek
or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Or-
ganization." U.N. CHARTER art. 100.
121. The same concern of "beholdenness" applies to the existing Security Council recom-
mendation process, see supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text, except major power, not
regional, influence is involved.
122. PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, Rule 18, at 4,
U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.7, U.N. Sales No. E.83.I.4 (1983) (as amended 12/21/82).
123. The General Assembly presidency "rotates annually among the five regions." PE-
TERSON, supra note 60, at 267. This practice was established in 1963, G.A. Res. 1990, U.N.
GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, Annex, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/Res/1990 (1963), and amended
in 1978, G.A. Res. 33/138, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 45, Annex, at 75, U.N. Doc.
A/33/45 (1978) (making the five regions Africa, Asia, East Europe, West Europe, and Latin
America).
124. See PETERSON, supra note 60, at 279-80 (discussing limited authority of the presi-
dency of the General Assembly). The term for a president of the Security Council-only one
month-indicates its unimportance. PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, supra note 122, at 4 (Rule 18).
125. The Organization of African Unity resolved in 1981 that "now [is] the time for Africa
to contest for the post," and approved the "candidature of Salim Ahmed Salim [of Tanzania]
as Africa's candidature." Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U.N.
General Assembly, 36th Sess., Annex, Agenda Items 16 & 29, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/36/557
(1981) (copy of OAU resolution annexed to General Assembly records). The OAU obtained
the support of the Non-Aligned Movement for this candidature. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess.,
Supp. Jul.-Sep. 1981, at 86, U.N. Doc. S/14712 (1981) (copy of resolution annexed to letter to
the Security Council).
126. D-Day Nears in UN Race, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 21, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World library, Allnws file.
127. Paul Lewis, Egyptian Leads Voting for U.N. Post, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991, at A3.
The Non-Aligned Movement is "a grouping of States which assert political and military inde-
pendence from both the Western and Soviet blocs .... [T]he movement was formally estab-
lished ... in Belgrade in 1961 .... [I]n 1983 ... [it included] virtually all states which have
acceded to independence since 1945." ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 119, at 258. The Movement is still staking out a role for itself, despite the
end of the bipolar world that spurred its formation. See Philip Shenon, Non-Aligned Move-
ment Redefines Itself, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, 1992, at A14.
128. Ghali, an Egyptian, was seen as both an Arab and an African, but some "black Afri-
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some other factor in "the present haphazard, increasingly parochial,
predominantly political process" 129 is not clear.
The perception that the position of Secretary-General is occupied by
a representative of a certain region, nominated by others from that re-
gion, is dangerous to the image of impartiality that the United Nations
must maintain. Regional rotation emerged as an informal technique to
exert influence in a system, established in 1945, that affords five nations
ultimate control over who will be chosen to represent the world commu-
nity. Regional rotation's appeal may be diminished by giving its advo-
cates a greater voice in the method of selection. Regional self-interest
might survive, but without regional rotation it would have to express
itself in the electoral process.
IH. Criteria for a Changing Global Political Order
The time has come for a change in the election process. The voting
rules had little justification in 1945 aside from superpower placation.
They have no justification today. Furthermore, they have spawned
problems ranging from inadequate leadership to the paralysis of the
United Nations as a neutral international forum. Current changes in the
global political order present an opportunity to rebalance the election
process and to address the problems it has created.
A. A Changing Order
Several aspects of the changing global political order signal the crite-
ria needed to develop an appropriate proposal for reform. The most dra-
matic aspect of this changing order is represented by the combination of
the growing "tide" of democratization and the end of the Cold War, the
two most noted characteristics of the so-called "new world order." 130
Democratization invokes choice and popular participation in decision-
making. These concepts are recognized in an international treaty "guar-
anteeing the free expression of the will of the electors."1 31 The rules for
electing the Secretary-General should embrace these concepts by guaran-
teeing the free expression of the will of more than just the permanent
members of the Security Council.
can diplomats made clear that they preferred a black African over Mr. Ghali." Paul Lewis,
Security Council Selects Egyptian for Top U.N. Post, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at A1.
129. URQUHART & CHILDERS, supra note 9, at 29.
130. See, eg., Franck, supra note 11, at 601-02. "The Bush administration.., coined the
phrase 'new world order.'" Schlesinger, supra note 11, at 4. This Note uses "changing global
political order" to be more descriptive and accurate.
131. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, art.
25(b), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179.
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Developing nations have reason to be "fearful of being marginalized
by the end of the cold war"132 in that one of the few means of exerting
political leverage in world affairs during the Cold War was to play the
superpowers off against each other.133 After a decade of economic de-
cline, 134 these nations will likely become increasingly marginalized as the
developed nations increase their intercooperation, and divert develop-
ment aid to Eastern Europe: 135 "[S]uperpower cooperation [has its] po-
tential negative aspects, especially for the Third World."' 136 South
American journalist Eduardo Galeano states it bluntly but eloquently:
"Stolen geography, plundered economy, falsified history, daily usurpa-
tion of reality: the so-called Third World, inhabited by third-class peo-
ples, encompasses less, eats less, remembers less, lives less, says less."' I37
The developing nations need a strong voice in the United Nations. Al-
lowing them greater involvement in the election of the Secretary-General
would help meet that need.
Another development in the changing global political order, one
that has not been widely reported, is the increase in proposals for reform
of the United Nations Secretariat. 138 Reform has been proposed in the
past, 39 but recently has picked up momentum as worldwide interest in
132. The Right Choice for the U.N., supra note 19, at A30.
133. See JOHN FEFFER, BEYOND DETENTE: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. OP-
TIONS 130 (1990) (discussing "competition for influence in the Third World"). The usefulness
of this tactic did not translate into significant influence in the selection of the Secretary-Gen-
eral, however, because in the recommendation vote the permanent members need no proxies-
their veto power is an effective substitute.
134. "[T]he shame of the 1980s is that the poor [nations] are still getting poorer and the
rich richer." GWYNETH WILLIAMS, THIRD WORLD POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 110 (1987);
see also FEFFER, supra note 133, at 133-35 (discussing economic hardship and decline in the
Third World); Widening Gap Reported Between Rich, Poor Nations, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 24,
1992, at A20.
135. As Professor Reisman has observed,
With the ending of the Cold War, the strategic value of many parts of the Third
World will diminish, if not evaporate. International development aid, which was
directed, in limited amounts and often for strategic reasons, to the Third World and
which was an important part of its development program, could be drastically re-
duced as the finite amount of such aid is redirected to Eastern and Central Europe.
Then the frequently mentioned "North-South" division will come into much sharper
focus.
W. Michael Reisman, International Law after the Cold War, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 859, 863
(1990).
136. FEFFER, supra note 133, at 136.
137. EDUARDO GALEANO, WE SAY No 209 (Mark Fried trans., 1992).
138. Under article 97 of the Charter the Secretariat is "comprise[d of] a Secretary-General
and such staff as the Organization may require." U.N. CHARTER art. 97.
139. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 164, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 357-58 (1955) (congressional staff
study on review of the U.N. Charter); DEP'T OF STATE, REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING OF
THE U.N. SYSTEM 24-25, 46-47 (1978) (discussing modification of the veto power in the Secur-
ity Council); United Nations: Group of High Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the
[Vol. 44
November 1992] ELECTING THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL
the United Nations has increased. 140 In an effort to bring the Secretariat
more in line with the independent body envisioned in the Charter,141 a
group of twenty-two nations recently developed a plan that both stream-
lines the Secretariat and limits the influence of the major powers in its
day-to-day operations. 142 The plan discards the present hierarchy of offi-
cials under the Secretary-General by creating new departments in a py-
ramidal structure.143 It also limits to one the number of officers from any
one country, eliminating "the current system under which the big powers
have established monopolies over certain key Secretariat posts, in effect
depriving the secretary-general of the power to appoint people he
wants."' 144 The clear aim of the plan is to increase the independence and
effectiveness of the Secretariat. This movement complements efforts to
make the position of Secretary-General itself more independent.
The increasingly vocal demands for improvements in the process of
candidate recruitment, particularly by former U.N. Undersecretary-Gen-
eral Brian Urquhart, represent recent efforts to reform electoral proce-
dure.145 Currently, there is no procedure for recruitment;146 the process
has "been largely confined to a procedure to secure a nomination. There
has been little or no methodical search in order to find candidates out-
standingly equipped for an important and extraordinarily difficult
job."' 147 While the recommendations for an improved selection process
have included term limitations and the elimination of campaigning, most
focus on the establishment of an organized search and evaluation mecha-
nism. 148 The Security Council's recommendation function, if properly
altered, might provide the basis for such a mechanism.
B. Criteria for Reform
The Secretary-General's independence must be fortified, both to free
the position from undue political influence and to enable the Secretary-
General to fulfill his (or hopefully in the future, her) proper function as a
Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the U.N. - Report, 26 I.L.M. 145
(1987).
140. See U.N. Considers Increasing Power of Secretary-General, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 17,
1991, at A8 (outlining recent proposal for Secretariat reform) [hereinafter Increasing Power];
URQUHART & CHILDERS, supra note 9; Jakobson, supra note 28.
141. The "exclusively international character of the" Secretariat necessitates "the highest
standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity." U.N. CHARTER arts. 100-01.
142. See Increasing Power, supra note 140, at A8.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See URQUHART & CHILDERS, supra note 9; Urquhart, supra note 15.
146. See supra notes 96-99, 125-129, and accompanying text.
147. URQUHART & CHILDERS, supra note 9, at 27.
148. Id. at 30.
representative of the "general interests" of both the developed and devel-
oping world. 149
At the same time, if the goal of reform is to elect the Secretary-
General through more democratic procedures, any proposal to increase
the General Assembly's involvement in the process must account for the
fact that the General Assembly is not a strictly representative body; na-
tions have the same voting power regardless of the size of their popula-
tion or monetary contribution to the U.N. system.I5 0 The importance of
major power accession to reform must be addressed as well, 15' because
withdrawal of economic or political support by major powers would crip-
ple the system.' 52
Finally, any proposal for reform must have some chance of adop-
tion. Amendments to the Charter are difficult to accomplish and conse-
quently rare. 153 Procedural amendments are potentially less difficult in
the Security Council, 54 and much easier in the General Assembly. 155
IV. The Proposal
This Note proposes to eliminate the inconsistencies in the election
process created at the San Francisco Conference, 56 accommodate the
149. RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 375.
150. Regardless of the size of their populations, "[e]ach member of the General Assembly
shall have one vote." U.N. CHARTER art. 18, 1. Contributions to the U.N. system are made
by reference to a sliding scale, based upon national product (ability to pay). EVERYONE'S
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 7, at 29.
151. The United Nations' viability depends both financially and politically on the major
powers. The permanent members of the Security Council contribute approximately 47% of
the organization's budget. See EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS, supra note 7, at 29. The
United States' share alone is 25%. Id. Withdrawal of that support would bring the organiza-
tion to a standstill. Politically, the U.N. would have hardly the same level of prestige and
influence it enjoys presently if the major powers refused to acknowledge its actions.
152. See Pepi A. Hoffer, Note, Upheaval in the United Nations System: United States
Withdrawal from UNESCO, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 161 (1986); see also Richard W. Nelson,
International Law and the U.S. Withholding of Payments to International Organizations, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 973 (1986).
153. Amendments to the Charter "come into force ... when they have been adopted by a
vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified.., by two thirds of the
Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Coun-
cil." U.N. CHARTER art. 108. The Charter has only been amended once, to increase the
number of non-permanent members in the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, and also
increase the size of the Economic and Social Council. EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS, supra
note 7, at 434-35, 441.
154. The sponsoring powers at the San Francisco Conference stated that amendment in
the Security Council would require a qualified majority, but that position was never formally
approved and has been debated since. BAILEY, supra note 16, at 214-23.
155. "[T]he determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-
thirds majority [vote], shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting." U.N.
CHARTER art. 18, 3.
156. See supra Part I.
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relevant effects of the changing global political order, and facilitate the
creation of a mechanism for improved candidate selection,1 57 by redefin-
ing each stage of the electoral process.
A. In the Security Council
The Security Council's recommendation of a candidate for Secre-
tary-General should be redefined as a "procedural matter" under the
Charter, eliminating the requirement that all five permanent members
concur in the recommendation. 158 Subjecting the recommendation to a
simple nine-vote majority would resolve a number of the problems identi-
fied in this Note.
First, given the breakdown of matters into measures for the mainte-
nance of international security and "other matters," such an amendment
would properly classify the act of recommendation under the terms of
the U.N. Charter. 159 The recommendation would no longer be subject to
deadlock among the permanent members, preventing any recurrence of
the events of Lie's re-election and Waldheim's election. The "lowest
common denominator" problem, a product of naked political compro-
mise among the superpowers, would be eliminated. 160
The misguided argument for regional rotation would also be under-
cut by a rebalancing of the recommendation process. Arguing for re-
gional rotation was one of the few means of influencing the permanent
members' recommendation. The utility of the regional rotation argu-
ment would be greatly diminished if the permanent members were de-
prived of their veto power.
Finally, eliminating the qualified majority requirement would create
the opportunity to formalize the "recommendation" process through a
mechanism for the recruitment and evaluation of candidates, an idea that
already enjoys considerable support.161 This in turn would increase the
chances of finding "the best possible secretary-general regardless of
nationality."1 62
The hurdles to such a change in Security Council procedure are
identifiable. Amendment of the U.N. Charter would not be necessary 163
157. See, e.g., URQUHART & CHILDERS, supra note 9, at 29-30 (proposing creation of
search group, nomination structure, and change in term of office).
158. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 2. Procedural matters require only a nine-vote majority.
Id.
159. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
160. The possibility of a poorly-qualified Secretary-General would not, of course, be elimi-
nated under this proposal. Majorities do not always make the most enlightened choice. The
lowest common denominator problem is a different matter-it was the neglect of qualifications
in the search for the least unacceptable candidate among the permanent members.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 145-148.
162. Urquhart, supra note 15, at 164.
163. Avoiding the necessity of Charter amendment is highly desirable because of the polit-
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as it does not explicitly state whether a recommendation is "proce-
dural."' 64 The qualified majority requirement is instead found in the
agreements reached at the San Francisco Conference and the General
Assembly resolution formally adopting them.165 The resolution itself is
easily repealed, requiring only a simple majority in the General Assem-
bly. 166 The only remaining obstacle is the resolve of the permanent
members to maintain the status quo. 16 7 The likelihood of unyielding
resistance is small, however, given the major powers' renewed interest in
the United Nations 68 and the fact that no immediate effect adverse to
their interests would result from adopting this Note's proposal. 169
B. In the General Assembly
The election of the Secretary-General in the General Assembly
should be redefined as an "important question" under the Charter, sub-
jecting it to a two-thirds vote. 170 Although not as critical as the proposed
change in Security Council procedure, this redefinition would parallel the
change in the recommendation procedure and yield several benefits.
First, the election would parallel elections to less important posi-
tions, which are already subject to a two-thirds vote. This anomaly has
remained unchallenged since 1945 because of the General Assembly's
relatively insignificant role in the election under the current process.1 71
The more important effect of the "important question" recharacter-
ization would be its impact on future elections. By assuming the central
role in an election, the General Assembly would be responsible for pro-
ducing a generally acceptable Secretary-General. A two-thirds vote re-
quirement would help offset the undemocratic flavor of unweighted
voting in the General Assembly. 172 It would also assuage the major pow-
ical and procedural difficulties involved. See supra note 153. The major powers dislike open-
ing up the Charter for fear of a flood of proposed amendments, most likely directed at the
provisions relating to the Council's veto and other powers.
164. The Charter only states that the General Assembly acts "upon the recommendation
of the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 97.
165. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
166. U.N. CHARTER art. 18, 3.
167. It is in each permanent member's self-interest to be able to veto candidates, of course,
but permanent members are also adverse to change generally that might lead to further re-
forms. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 60, at 173-79.
168. See Gordenker, supra note 2, at 75.
169. The only possible "adverse" impact on a permanent member would be if a Secretary-
General, whom the member would otherwise have vetoed, was elected. The chance of such a
major conflict is small, however, because permanent members would still be able to voice their
opinions, which carry a great deal of weight, see supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text, in
both the recommendation and election stages of the process.
170. See supra note 30.
171. The General Assembly has never rejected a recommended candidate, BAILEY, supra
note 16, at 288, an acknowledgement that it has little say in the matter.
172. Since each member of the General Assembly has one vote, regardless of the size of its
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ers' fears of relinquishing their veto power over recommendations in the
Security Council.
Implementing the General Assembly component of this proposal is
simpler than implementing the Security Council reforms. The General
Assembly may by a straight majority vote classify the election of the Sec-
retary-General as an "important question" and rescind its 1946 resolu-
tion173 that adopted the existing election procedures. 174
C. Effect on the Changing Global Political Order
This rebalancing of the election process would have a positive influ-
ence on the changing global political order. It would enable the develop-
ing nations, which represent a large majority in the General Assembly, 175
to play a greater role in filling the most important position in the United
Nations. North-South relations have not improved significantly in the
last thirty years, and economic conditions among the developing nations
have actually worsened. In an emerging political and economic order
dominated by the United States and its allies, a Secretary-General able to
act in the interests of all nations is needed more than ever.
The emphasis on democratic principles in this emerging world order
also supports the idea of a more democratic means of selecting the Secre-
tary-General. 176 Resolving the fundamental differences between the for-
mer Soviet Union and the other major powers has undermined the
justification for applying the qualified majority rule. The earlier para-
digm of a divided group of permanent members is rapidly becoming
overshadowed by a division between the Security Council and the Gen-
eral Assembly. This Note's proposal addresses that division in much the
same way that the qualified majority system addressed the need for a
balance during the Cold War.
Conclusion
The developments of the past three years have both increased the
need for change and opened the door to such change. Reformation of the
process for electing the Secretary-General addresses the need for change
by taking advantage of that opening. The rules that guide the current
process have created problems in every election since the Second World
War, and have produced several major fiascoes. With the end of the
population, U.N. CHARTER art. 18, 1, a simple majority can potentially represent only a
small fraction of the world's population. See PETERSON, supra note 60, at 56-7.
173. See Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, supra note 5, at 269.
174. See U.N. CHARTER art. 18, 3.
175. PETERSON, supra note 60, at 13.
176. "Democracy... is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that increasingly
will be promoted and protected by collective international processes." Thomas M. Franck,
The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 46 (1992).
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Cold War, these rules became obsolete and unjustified. Clearly, a change
is in order, and the redefinitions proposed in this Note not only address
the needs of today, but provide a strong foundation for the future of the
Secretary-General in a revitalized United Nations.
